Union College

Union | Digital Works
Honors Theses

Student Work

6-2011

Reform in the Credit Rating Industry
Ronald D. Knox
Union College - Schenectady, NY

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses
Part of the Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Knox, Ronald D., "Reform in the Credit Rating Industry" (2011). Honors Theses. 1009.
https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses/1009

This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Union | Digital Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of Union | Digital Works. For more information, please contact digitalworks@union.edu.

Reform In The Credit Rating Industry

by

Ron Knox

*********

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
Honors in the Department of Economics

UNION COLLEGE
June, 2011

Abstract
KNOX, RON. Reform in the Credit Rating Industry. Department of Economics, June
2011.
ADVISOR: Professor Mehmet Fuat Sener

Ninety three percent of all AAA-rated subprime mortgage backed securities
issued in 2006 were downgraded to junk bond status subsequent to the financial crisis.
The credit rating agencies clearly failed to give the early warning signs on these and
numerous financial products that went bust.
This thesis investigates the role of credit rating agencies in the functioning of
financial markets and proposes policy changes to reform this industry. The sources of
market failures in this industry can be traced to conflicts of interest, barriers to entry, lack
of accountability, and asymmetric information. I propose three possible reforms to
improve the efficiency and accuracy of financial product ratings: a government-based
model, a subscription-based model, and a market-based model. I provide a comparative
evaluation of each model, discuss their implementability and demonstrate how they can
solve the identified market imperfections.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The credit rating industry has been a central focus of the financial world since the
2007 financial crisis. During the 2007 financial crisis nearly $3.2 trillion 1 in loans were
provided to homeowners with bad debt and undocumented income. These mortgages
were then packaged up into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt
obligations (CDO). These two financial innovations, along with the ratings provided by
the agencies, played a significant role in the 2007 financial crisis. A mortgage-backed
security is a type of asset that is secured by a mortgage or collection of mortgages. These
securities are also grouped in one of the top two ratings as determined by an accredited
credit rating agency, and usually pay periodic payments that are similar to coupon
payments. Furthermore, the mortgage must have originated from a regulated and
authorized financial institution. Collateralized debt obligations are an investment-grade
security backed by a pool of bonds, loans and other assets. CDOs do not specialize in one
type of debt but are often non-mortgage loans or bonds.
The reason why these two innovations had such a large impact during the last
recession was because they received very high ratings; mostly AAA, from credit ratings
agencies and the products were not actually worthy of AAA ratings. Receiving a AAA
rating means that these products are the safest type of products with the lowest
probability of default. When a product receives a AAA rating, this means that there will
typically be a strong demand for the product. This rating is also important because certain
institutions and investors can only invest in products with AAA ratings, so without these
ratings the demand would have been significantly less and many institutions could not

1

See Economic Review Journal. Statistics compiled by Bloomberg.
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have purchased them. These financial products were problematic because of the
underlying mortgages and loans that were issued were sub-prime, which ended up
defaulting when the homeowners could not make the mortgage payments. Nearly 80% 2
of all the sub-prime mortgages that were issued were adjustable rate mortgages. Initially,
the homeowners could afford the monthly payments, however, when the rate of the
mortgage increased, they could no longer make the monthly payments, thus defaulting
(see graph below for foreclosure numbers).

QuickTime™ and a
decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

This meant that these two products lost significant value and at some point, nearly,
became worthless. Banks and other institutions that invested in these products ended up

2

See “Senator Dodd: Create, Sustain, Preserve, and Protect the American Dream of
Home Ownership”. Dodd. 2007.
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having to write off over $525 billion 3 in losses as a result of the defaults on the
mortgages. There was significant moral hazard associated with the financial institutions
that issued these mortgages and loans to subprime debtors, that should have never
received the loans. The banks that issued these mortgages did not have to hold the
mortgages because they would get packaged up and sold to investors. Some speculate
that the issuers of the mortgages did not actually care if the individuals were worthy to
receive these loans; they just wanted to write as many loans as they could so they could
make as much money as possible. When these loans defaulted, the issuers were not
holding the mortgages so they didn’t have the losses that the investors had. This is just
one example of how credit rating agencies and highly rated financial products can have a
large impact on financial markets as well as the overall economy.
What role did credit rating agencies play in the financial crisis? The credit rating
agencies were the catalyst for the 2007 financial crisis. Credit rating agencies were
largely responsible for the unsustainable growth of the asset-backed debt markets 4 , which
eventually led to the crisis. These agencies fueled the growth for asset-backed debt
markets because they were providing ratings on these financial products. As long as these
products receive an “investment grade” rating, there will be substantial demand and the
higher the rating of the product, the safer it is considered to be. Many of the structured
finance products that were being created, such as CDOs, were extremely complex and
very opaque, thus, the market depended on credit rating agencies. The high ratings lured
investors in to the market and caused the market to expand significantly. The downgrades
3

For more information on losses that result from sub prime mortgages see Onaran
(2008).
4
For more information on the 2007 financial crisis see: Reinhart, Carmen; Rogoff,
Kenneth. (2007)
6

on financial products caused the market to collapse just as fast. The credit rating agencies
created a demand for these asset-backed financial products by inaccurately rating them.
The financial products, evidently, were not worthy of the ratings they received but
investors, blindly, made investment decisions based off of the ratings these agencies
provided.

A. Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Financial Markets
Credit rating agencies play a critical role in the operation of financial markets.
Credit rating agencies provide information and quality assessments on various financial
innovations 5 . The main objective of these agencies, such as Moody’s, is to determine the
creditworthiness of firms and securities. In order to provide their ratings, they analyze
various financial, industry, and economic information. The credit ratings agencies receive
fees from the issuers that were rated. Credit rating agencies are essential in the financial
markets and numerous institutions and regulators rely on their ratings. Credit rating
agencies can have a dramatic impact on a firm’s securities because they provide
information to the buyers and sellers. Ratings can help a securities price as well as
liquidity.
There are a couple problems with credit ratings agencies. First, credit ratings only
contain information about cash flow risk. However, they do not include systemic risk
factors. This means that the ratings do not take economic statistics and factors into
consideration. An example of this is how the credit ratings agencies rated mortgagebacked securities; they did not take into consideration how a housing market collapse
5

For more information on the role of credit rating agencies see: Coval, Joshua, Jurek,
Jakub, Stafford, Erik. (2008)
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would affect mortgage-backed securities and investors. A second problem with the credit
rating agencies is their lack of transparency in the ratings process. Another concern is that
there may be a conflict of interest between the credit rating agencies and the issuers being
rated. There may be a conflict of interest because the issuers are paying the credit rating
agencies for their services. Credit rating agencies play an extremely large role on
financial markets because institutions, regulators, and personal investors all make
investment decisions based on their ratings.

B. Credit Rating Agencies During the Financial Crisis
The three major credit rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch)
rated numerous products incorrectly during the 2007 financial crisis. The ratings agencies
were not affected by the inaccurate rating like many large institutions and investors. The
credit rating agencies did not have to write off billions of dollars in loses, which is
exactly what the institutions and investors had to do. However, a feedback mechanism
that could have affected the credit rating could have been their share price. If there was a
significant decline in the credit rating agencies’ share prices than this would indicate that
the market is holding them accountable. The only credit rating agency of the three major
ones that is not a subsidiary is Moody’s. Moody’s is publicly traded and its symbol is
MCO. Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings are both subsidiaries of larger companies,
McGraw-Hill Companies and Fimalac, respectively. How was the share price of each of
the companies affected by the financial crisis?
Each of these three companies had a significant drop in their share prices during
and after the recession. Moody’s share price had rapidly increased since 2000 reaching its

8

all time high in October of 2007 of $73.71 6 per share. Throughout the financial crisis,
Moody’s share value steadily decline to a low of $16.04 per share. This is a significant
loss of market capitalization and was seen with the other credit rating agencies parent
companies as well. McGraw-Hill Companies (symbol MHP) reach an all time high of
$71 per share in 2007 and dropped to a low of $17.64 per share during early 2009.
Fimalac (symbol FIM.PA) also reached its high in 2007 at $80.12 per share and
significantly decreased to $21.80 per share in 2009. These three companies follow a
similar pattern, losing a considerable amount of market capitalization throughout the
financial crisis.
Was the decrease in share value a result of their inaccurate ratings? It is plausible
that each of these companies lost nearly 80% of their market capitalization as a result of
their failure to accurately rate numerous financial products. However, during the same
time period the major stock indices also lost significant value, some as high as 60% of its
overall value. These three companies had larger losses in value relative to the stock
indices. It is possible that the market was holding the companies accountable for their
inaccurate ratings but it is difficult to determine if that was the only factor considering the
overall stock market had tremendous losses as well.
The contribution of this paper is to analyze the credit rating agency, identify
possible imperfections, and propose reforms that could address these issues. Section 2
discusses the history of the credit rating industry, the identified market imperfections, and
how the product rating market has addressed some of the same problems that are
prominently observed in the credit rating industry. Section 3 presents policy

6

All share prices were obtained from Yahoo Finance.
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recommendations and alternatives to the current system as well as recent legislations that
have attempted to hold credit rating agencies more accountable. The last section
summarizes my findings and discusses the shortcomings of the paper.
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Chapter 2: Analysis of Credit Rating Agencies
As a result of the financial crisis of 2007, there has been a significant amount of
focus on the credit rating industry and some of its potential market failures. The three
main rating agencies are Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch. The credit rating market
can be best described as an oligopoly. Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s each control 40%
of the market, Fitch has a market share of 14%, and seven other companies control the
remaining 6% 7 . Each of these three companies is a Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organization, appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The recent
recession has brought credit rating agencies to the forefront and suggests that there might
be some imperfections in the credit rating market. There could be potential imperfections
in the credit rating industry because of the lack of competition, conflicts of interest,
quality of ratings, and lack of accountability. Credit rating agencies have been a focal
point because of the ratings they provided to some of the financial products, which in
hindsight, were clearly not deserving of those ratings. One specific example is when the
big three credit rating agencies failed to downgrade Enron’s investment ratings prior to
the company’s bankruptcy. As a result, individual investors held civil suits against most
of the major credit rating agencies. The ratings that the three main agencies provide to
financial products are listed below:

7

See White (2001) for more information.
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Table 1: Types of Ratings
Rating Group

Moody's

Rating Agency
S&P, Fitch

Investment Grade

AAA
AA
A
Baa

AAA
AA
A
BBB

Speculative Grade

Ba
B
Caa
Ca
C

BB
B
CCC
CC
C

D

D

Default

The Table 1 above illustrates how the credit rating agencies determine the credit
worthiness of financial product. The highest rating with the least amount of risk is a AAA
rating, while the lowest rating with the highest amount of risk is a C rating. Investment
grade products are rated BBB or Baa and above. Ratings are essential in the credit rating
industry because they could drive demand to a specific product or cause a dramatic sell
off, if downgraded.

A. Industrial Background
John Moody was the first one publishing bond ratings. Moody’s firm first started
publishing bond ratings in 1909 8 . This financial innovation sparked other companies to
enter the market. Poor’s Publishing Company entered in 1916, Standard Statistics

8

See “The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis” by White (2001)
for more information.
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Company in 1922, and Fitch Publishing Company in 1924. Initially these rating
companies sold their ratings to investors and investors paid for their product.
During the 1920s and 1930s thousands of banks failed as a result of the Great
Depression. Throughout the decade of the 1920’s an average of 70 banks failed nationally
each year 9 . The number of bank failures significantly increased in the 1930s. In the year
of 1933, it is estimated that over 4,000 banks defaulted and around 9,000 banks defaulted
for the entire decade of the 1930s. As a result of these bank failures, a few key changes
that took place. The first change is the creation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1934. The SEC prompted legislative changes, which incorporated credit
ratings, making these agencies even more important. The SEC and new legislation
encouraged banks to hold safe bonds in their portfolios to reduce risk. In 1936, federal
regulations prohibited banks from investing in any product that was “speculative.” This
meant that they could only hold financial products that were “investment grade”,
meaning that they were BBB or better. These guidelines still apply to banks today. This
financial regulation made credit rating agencies key players in the financial markets and,
also, provided them with a significant amount of power. Banks could no longer make
their own judgments about the risk of a certain financial products, they were required to
go on the ratings of the main credit rating agencies. Insurance companies also started to
use credit ratings when state regulators wanted the companies to have adequate capital to
support the riskiness of the bonds they held. The state imposed capital requirements as a
result and credit rating agencies were once again called upon. In 1941, Standard and
Poor’s merged to form the big three credit rating agencies that are present today. During

9

See Ganzel (2003)
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the 1970s, federal regulators required pension funds, state and federal, to get their ratings
from these agencies. In 1975, the SEC created the Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organization (NRSRO) to ensure that there weren’t illegitimate firms creating
AAA ratings. The SEC “grandfathered” the big three firms in; Moody’s, Standard &
Poor’s, and Fitch. The SEC and federal regulators adopted the NRSROs as a source of
ratings that their financial institutions must heed in their choices in financial products.
By the end of 2000, there were only three NRSROs. The SEC was the regulator
that limited entry into the market. Some believe, the SEC was not transparent in its
selections for NRSROs either. Up until 2000 or so, they never had defined criteria and
never explained its decisions when rejecting applications. In 2003, the SEC was feeling
pressure to expand the number of NRSROs so it admitted Dominion Bond Rating
Services. In 2005, the SEC admitted A.M. Best into the NRSRO. In 2006, Congress
passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, which instructed the SEC to allow other
agencies to enter the market and also made them develop a strict set of guidelines. In
2007, there were three new agencies admitted; Japan Credit Rating Agency, Rating and
Information, Inc., and Egan-Jones. In 2008, two more were admitted; Lace Financial and
Realpoint. Although more agencies have entered the credit rating market, they have not
been competing with the big three and imperfections in the market still exist. These
companies have not been directly competing with the big three because some of the
companies rate different products, like insurance, and because of the reputation of the
main three agencies.

14

B. Imperfections in the Credit Rating Industry
i. Lack of Competition
What are the underlying imperfections in the credit rating market? The first major
flaw with the credit rating market is the lack of competition. Competition encourages
firms to be more accurate with their ratings or else institutions and investors will no
longer consider utilizing those ratings. Competition drives often leads to low quality
companies exiting the market. There are two main reasons why there is a lack of
competition in the credit rating industry, regulation and reputation. In 1975 10 , the SEC
designated bond-rating agencies as “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations”
(NRSROs). The SEC automatically designated the current big three agencies (Moody’s,
Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch) as NRSROs. This automatic designation “grandfathered”
them into their current positions and the oligopoly market. This designation meant that
companies had to go through these agencies in order to have their products rated, so the
SEC effectively established an oligopoly market for credit rating agencies. The structure
of this market has remained the same for the past 30 years until recent regulations.
Current regulations also slightly limit who enters the market, the ultimate decision is left
up to the SEC. The second reason that there is a lack of competition is because of
reputational capital 11 . Reputational capital plays a significant role because investors and
institutions rely on established agencies with a reputation of accurate ratings. Moody’s
CEO, Raymond McDaniel, once said “ we are in a business where reputational capital is

10

For further information see “Testimony: The Role and Impact of Credit Rating
Agencies on the Subprime Credit Markets” by Christopher Cox (Chairman of the SEC)
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/ts092607cc.htm
11
Partnoy (1999) discusses reputational capital and how important it is to credit rating
agencies.
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more important.” Reputational capital makes entry into the market difficult because
institutions will continue to use an agency with a track record as opposed to a brand new
agency with no reputation.
Institutions and investors also prefer a few agencies rather than a larger number of
agencies. The reason for this is because that when reading the ratings on certain financial
products they prefer not to have numerous different ratings by different companies.
Investors prefer a select group of ratings because it keeps transaction costs low. A large
number of credit rating agencies, essentially, requires the investor to do more research to
determine the actual rating of the financial product as oppose to a select group of
agencies doing it for them.
Although lack of competition is extremely important, there is a direct correlation
with the amount of competition in the credit rating market and quality of ratings
determined by the agencies. The way Becker and Milbourn (2009) determined the level
of competition was by Fitch’s market share. Meaning, when Fitch’s market share
increased there was more competition in the credit rating industry. The ratings were
gathered from all agencies, not just Fitch. The graph below clearly demonstrates that
competition promotes higher rates, and an overall lower quality of rating 12 . The blue bars
signify low competition in the credit rating market, meaning that Fitch had a relatively
small market share. The yellow bars signify periods, which Fitch had a larger market
share and competition was greater in the credit rating market. The graph below covers all
bond ratings from investment grade to speculative bonds. Starting with BBB- bonds and
12

See Becker and Milbourn (2009). Becker and Milbourn believe that even if there is
more competition in the credit rating industry, that it would not make a difference
because of the reputations of the existing firms in the market. The increased competition
will only strengthen the importance of reputation.
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moving right, it is evident that during periods of higher competition, bonds receive higher
ratings than in periods of low competition. Looking to the left of BBB- bonds another
trend emerges, during periods of low competition more financial products are rated lower
than in periods of high competition. The distribution of the ratings shifts to the right,
meaning higher rated products, during periods of high competition. This graph suggests
that competition has an impact on the ratings that the agencies provide. A lack of
competition in the market produces, overall, lower ratings, which mean that the ratings
are more accurate. The reason why competition is correlated to higher ratings is because
the agencies are competing for business; therefore they will issue higher ratings to be
more attractive to the companies that want to have their financial products rated. There is
a tradeoff between competition and the quality of ratings. Issuers of these financial
products benefit when there is more competition in the market. The argument is that more
firms in the market will provide better quality ratings but this is the exact opposite
because more firms are competing for business and thus inflate their ratings to attract
companies. However, this problem could be alleviated if the credit rating agencies were
held accountable for their ratings. Credit rating agencies might be held accountable if
regulation held them liable for the ratings they provided, meaning institutions and
investors could sue them. Another way in which credit rating agencies could be held
accountable is by facing fines and large penalties for inaccurate ratings. These are a few
examples of what could be done.

17

Source: Becker and Milbourn (2009)

ii. Conflicts of Interest
The second significant flaw with credit rating agencies is that there are severe
conflicts of interest. There are two main models that the agencies use; the issuer-pay
model and the subscription model. There are conflicts of interest associated with each
model. The issuer-pay model is how credit rating agencies generate the majority of their
revenue. This is when the institutions pay the agencies in order to have their financial
products rated. A conflict of interest arises from this because the agencies could provide
inflated credit ratings in order to attract customers and increase their revenue. Inflated
credit ratings are concerning because investment decisions are made based on credit
ratings, an inflated credit rating could draw more investors to a low quality financial
product. A conflict of interest also arises from the subscription model; this is the model
18

that product-rating agencies use. The subscription model 13 is when institutions and
investors pay the agencies a fee in order to receive their ratings. There are conflicts of
interest with this model because large subscribers are typically institutions and hedge
funds. These subscribers typically have long and short positions on various rated
products. A long positions means that they anticipate the price of the product they own to
increase. A short position is when the investors anticipate that the value of a product is
going to decrease, a short position essentially bets against a product. If the credit rating
agencies were to downgrade a product that the institutions have a long position in, then it
could lead to potential losses. Therefore, the rating agencies are incentivized to provide
ratings that benefit their clients or else they might lose their subscribers. Both models that
credit rating agencies use have inherent conflicts of interest, making it difficult for the
agencies to provide objective ratings.
iii. Credit Rating Agencies Have Become Market Creators
With their ratings, credit rating agencies can channel demand to certain products.
They have the ability to influence investors to purchase certain products depending on the
rating it receives. It also works in the opposite direction; credit rating agencies could
downgrade a product, leading to a significant sell off. The market acts directly upon the
credit ratings of financial products. The three main agencies all explain in their business
models that their ratings are opinions of the creditworthiness of the issuers. For example
Standard & Poor’s clearly states, “Credit ratings are opinions about credit risk published
by a rating agency. They express opinions about the ability and willingness of an issuer,

13

The subscription-based model eventually became obsolete in the credit rating industry
because of evolving technology and the free-rider problem. See “The Credit Rating
Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis” by White (2001).
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such as a corporation, state or city government, to meet its financial obligations in
accordance with the terms of those obligations. Credit ratings are also opinions about the
credit quality of an issue, such as a bond or other debt obligation, and the relative
likelihood that it may default. Ratings should not be viewed as assurances of credit
quality or exact measures of the likelihood of default. Rather, ratings denote a relative
level of credit risk that reflects a rating agency’s carefully considered and analytically
informed opinion as to the creditworthiness of an issuer or the credit quality of a
particular debt issue.”
Fitch has a similar statement for their business model; “Fitch is in the business of
publishing research and independent ratings and credit analysis of securities issued
around the world. A rating is our published opinion as to the creditworthiness of a
security distilled in a simple, easy to use grading system.” Lastly, Moody’s clearly states
“credit ratings are, and must be construed solely as, statements of opinion and not
statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, sell or hold any securities. Each
rating or other opinion must be weighed solely as one factor in any investment decision
made by or on behalf of any user of the information, and each such user must accordingly
make its own study and evaluation of each security and of each issuer and guarantor of,
and each provider of credit support for, each security that it may consider purchasing,
selling or holding.” These excerpts from the big three credit rating agencies’ mission
statements clearly demonstrate how they identify their ratings as a matter of opinion.
Each of their business models also discusses how investment decisions should not be
based on their ratings. However, we know that certain institutions, like state pension
funds, require investment in the safest products. It is clear that the ratings provided by

20

these agencies are directly acted upon and have an impact on the financial markets.
Conflicts of interest are once again an issue because these agencies can essentially
control what products investors will purchase.
iv. Asymmetric Information
The fourth imperfection, which is strongly tied to credit rating agencies being
market creators, is asymmetric information. There is a significant amount of asymmetric
information regarding credit rating agencies and the products they rate. The investors do
not have the same information as the sellers of these products, that is why credit rating
agencies get involved. However, the credit rating agencies still know more information
about the creditworthiness of a product than the investors in the product. Typically, the
issuers of the product know more about the creditworthiness of the product than the
ratings agencies. An example of this was during the past financial crisis. The issuers of
CDOs and MBS were putting together products that they knew would be highly rated but
the underlying assets were not worthy of these ratings. The majority of these products
defaulted or lost significant value, but the issuers of these products were unaffected
because they were the ones creating them. In order to make money they need to create a
demand for the products and the only way to do that is to have them highly rated. Thus,
there is a significant amount of asymmetric information on the issuers’ behalf. There is
also asymmetric information with credit rating agencies because investors trust their
opinions, when the credit rating agencies have more information than the investors. The
lack of transparency and significant amount of asymmetric information are a few of
issues in the credit rating market. A result of asymmetric information is adverse selection.
Adverse selection is a product of asymmetric information. Adverse selection means that

21

there are bound to be “bad” products in the market because sellers know more
information about the products than the buyers. This is true in the financial markets,
specifically the credit rating industry. The issuers of financial products know more about
their inherent risk than any other party. Therefore, “bad” financial products will be issued
and it is the credit rating agencies’ job to determine the quality of the product. If they
cannot properly asses the financial product’s inherent risk, a low quality product could be
issued and receive a high rating. Adverse selection tends to occur when there is
asymmetric information.
v. Accountability in the Credit Rating Industry
Why are credit rating agencies not accountable for their ratings? For the longest
time credit rating the SEC protected agencies. The SEC adopted a rule that exempted all
credit rating agencies from any liabilities 14 . The credit rating agencies that are exempt
from any liabilities could deceive investors if they wanted and the investors can’t sue for
the faulty information. This rule was passed nearly 30 years ago and stood throughout the
2007 financial crisis. These agencies have a significant effect on the financial markets
and for them to be giving out any rating with any repercussions is a serious problem. An
example of the effect these agencies can have is the AAA received by mortgage-backed
securities. Since the agencies put AAA ratings on mortgage backed securities and similar
products, investors believed they were risk-free assets and, thus, purchased them. Then,
once people started to realize that the ratings might be inaccurate, the agencies
downgraded the assets causing a downward spiral that lead to billions of dollars lost.
While institutions and investors wrote off $525 billion in loses, the agencies were not

14

See Nasiripour (2010)
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held accountable for their ratings. This demonstrates how credit rating agencies can
control investment and the sell off of financial products with their ratings and they are,
clearly, not held accountable for their “opinions”.
The five largest financial institutions that were involved with MBSs and CDOs
were Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill
Lynch. In 2004, the SEC passed legislation that enabled these institutions to issue
substantially more debt. These institutions then used the capital they received from
issuing the debt to invest in MBSs and CDOs. These five institutions alone reported over
$4.1 trillion in debt for the 2007 fiscal year. Not only were these institutions issuing more
debt but they also were using more leverage, increasing their exposure to MBS and
CDOs. The graph below demonstrates the substantial increases in leverage by these
institutions from 2003 to 2007. As a result of the excessive exposure and risk these
companies took to MBSs and CDOs, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns declared
bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch was bought by Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley each received a significant amount of capital from the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP). The losses of these institutions can be attributed to the financial
products they were exposed to, the ratings the products received from the agencies, and
the regulation that enabled excessive risk.

23

Although credit rating agencies are exempt from all liabilities under the Securities
Act of 1933, civil suits have been filed and taken to court. Credit rating agencies have
been sued in two forms; by institutions and by investors. However, neither or the groups
have been successful. For example, there was a lawsuit filed against Moody’s by the
Jefferson County School District in 1999. In this case, the school district claimed that the
poor rating provided by Moody’s was materially false. The school district also claimed
defamation and interference with contractual and business relations. This lawsuit was
dismissed from the county court, thus Moody’s was not held accountable. Another
example of an institutional lawsuit is Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s (2007). In this case,
Compuware was suing Moody’s because of alleged breach of contract, defamation, fraud,
and violations of the Investment Adviser’s Act for issuing a negative report on the
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company’s financial future. This case was dismissed from court and Moody’s was once
again not held accountable. A third example of an institution filing a lawsuit against a
credit rating agency was in 1999, County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos. Orange County
filed a $2 billion suit against Standard & Poor’s, which is a subsidiary of McGraw Hill
Cos., because of alleged breach of contract and professional negligence. Both parties
settled this lawsuit for $140,000, nothing close to the $2 billion in damages the county
claimed. Institutions filed these three lawsuits against credit rating agencies and each
lawsuit had a similar result.
Investors have filed civil suits against credit rating agencies as well. In 2005,
Enron investors filed a lawsuit against various credit rating agencies. The investors
claimed negligent misrepresentation and unfair trade practices in the U.S. Distrcit Court
for the Southern District of Texas for failing to downgrade Enron’s investment ratings
before it declared bankruptcy. This civil suit was dismissed from court and the court
found that the First Amendment protected the credit ratings agencies. Another example of
an investor suing a credit rating agency is Quinn v. McGraw Hill Cos. Quinn was a
majority shareholder of several Illinois banks who sued Standard & Poor’s as a result of
Standard & Poor’s rating on collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). The banks that
Quinn was a majority shareholder in, invested in CMOs after the banks were assured that
Standard & Poor’s would give the bonds an “A” rating. The CMOs were initially given
an “A” rating but were later downgraded to “CCC”, which is no longer investment grade.
As a result of the downgrade the banks and Quinn lost significant amounts of money. The
courts dismissed the case on the basis that Standard & Poor’s disclaimer says that S&P’s

25

ratings are not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold financial products. The lawsuits
filed by the investors have also ended in similarly to the ones filed by institutions.
The civil suits filed by both institutions and investors demonstrate how credit
rating agencies are not held accountable for their ratings. Each of the lawsuits filed
resulted in dismissal from court, with the exception of one that was settle for a small
fraction of the alleged damages. A lack of accountability is evident in the credit rating
industry. The companies produce ratings, which are acted upon by institutions and
investors, and when the ratings are incorrect, the First Amendment protects the agencies
ensuring that the civil suit will most likely be dismissed.
Recently, legislation was passed to hold credit rating agencies more accountable
for the information they provide. This piece of legislation was the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010). This act was intended to hold
NRSROs more accountable for their ratings. It holds the rating agencies accountable by
letting investors take action, by the means of a lawsuit, against them if they inaccurately
rate products. Although this is a step in the right direction there will need to be more
accountability in order to produce the most accurate ratings.
vi. Inaccurate Credit Ratings
The final failure in the credit rating market is the inflation of credit ratings. Credit
rating agencies have, some suspect knowingly, overrated financial products for various
reasons. This can have a dramatic impact on the financial markets and the investments of
institutions. The graph below demonstrates the amount of corporate default from 19202008. The amount of corporate default in 2008 is a sign of a major problem. Around $275

26

billion 15 in corporate bonds defaulted during 2008, many of which were not junk bonds
and had low probabilities of default, according to the credit rating agencies. These losses
were extremely significant and the inflated ratings were most likely contributed by a
conflict of interests as oppose to accidentally mis-rating the products. The nominal value
of corporate default was the highest it has ever been.

There are a few significant imperfections in the credit rating market that need to
be addressed. Recent legislation has taken a step toward holding rating agencies more
accountable, however much more needs to be done in order to ensure top quality,
objective ratings. Credit rating agencies have such a significant impact on the financial
markets, thus the reason why some policy changes might be needed. A market that has
been successful in producing accurate and nonbiased ratings is the product rating market.
The credit rating market might be able to incorporate some aspects of the product rating
market to ensure they produce the best credit ratings.
15

Fidelity Personal Investing-Credit Default Risk

27

The credit rating industry and the product rating market have many similarities.
Both industries are tasked with providing accurate ratings on various products in an
unbiased manor. Companies in the product rating industry have addressed some of the
credit rating market imperfections. The credit rating industry might be able to incorporate
some of the policies that the product rating market has in place.

C. Lessons from the Product Rating Market
The product rating market has been a relatively efficient rating market. There are
many aspects of the product rating market that make their ratings some of the most
reliable. One company with a great reputation is Consumer Reports. Consumer reports
rates a wide variety of products ranging from cars to televisions. They have taken many
steps to ensure that their ratings are unbiased and as accurate as possible. Consumer
Reports publishes its reviews and comparisons of consumer products and services based
on its own in-house testing. Consumer Reports allocates around $21 million per year for
its testing process. Their in-house testing is important because there is no other party
influencing the outcomes of their tests. Consumer Reports attempts to maintain objective
and provide a unbiased rating because they purchase all their products at full retail price.
This also eliminates conflicts of interest because they are paying what the consumer
would pay and are not receiving any free products. Consumer Reports uses the
subscription model to generate its revenue and currently has around 7.3 million
subscribers. The subscription model eliminates any conflicts of interest because
companies are not paying Consumer Reports to have their products rated, the way it
works in the credit rating industry, therefore Consumer Reports does not have any
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interest in inflating certain products ratings for certain companies to generate business.
Consumer Reports, also, does not print outside advertising and it doesn’t allow the
commercial use of its reports for selling products. This product rating company is strictly
focused on providing unbiased results to the consumers. They have taken substantial
measures to ensure that there are no conflicts of interest.
A significant benefit of the Consumer Reports subscription model is that it
provides feedback mechanisms. A feedback mechanism is a way the market reacts to the
ratings Consumer Reports provides. For example, if Consumer Reports frequently
inflates product rating and gives low quality products high ratings then consumers will
most likely stop subscribing for Consumer Reports services. Consumer Reports will then
lose revenue as a result of their poor ratings. A feedback mechanism should be the same
for the credit rating industry as well. However, two of the big three credit rating agencies
are not publicly traded because they are subsidiaries of other, larger companies,
eliminating the share price feedback mechanism. The only company, which is not a
subsidiary, which is publicly traded is Moody’s. A feedback mechanism might be
investors selling Moody’s shares as a result of poor ratings on financial products, but
there is no evidence that this occurs. Feedback mechanisms are crucial in the financial
markets and are lacking in the credit rating industry.
The main drawback from a subscription-based system, like Consumer Reports, is
that they do not rate all products in the market. This implies that there might be a bias
because the product rating companies might rate the popular products and overlook a
quality product that has not been discovered by the market yet. A product rating company
cannot rate every product in the market, making this a significant drawback.
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Another company in the product rating market is J.D. Power and Associates. J.D.
Power and Associates rates a wide variety of products including automobiles, boats,
electronics and insurance. They conduct their market research through consumer surveys,
which is completely funded by the company and sample sizes can range from a few
hundred to over 100,000. Although they fund their own surveys, they choose whether
their samples are randomly selected or consumer targeted. J.D. Power conducts its own
vehicle testing in addition to the consumer surveys. The majority of the company’s
revenue comes from other companies that utilize the market data that J.D. Power
provides. A small portion of their revenue comes from companies that purchase licenses
to use and quote J.D. Power and Associates results. There are potential conflicts of
interest because of the way they generate revenue. Companies that are purchasing J.D.
Power’s market data might influence J.D. Power to provide better ratings if J.D. Power
rates the company’s products. It is clear that J.D. Power has not taken the same steps as
Consumer Reports to address certain conflicts of interest. J.D. Power and Associates is
similar to credit rating agencies in certain aspects because the way they generate their
revenue, through an issuer-pay type of model, and the inherent conflicts of interest.
Although there might be some conflicts of interests, their ratings are highly regarded and
reliable.
How do the mission statements of product rating companies compare to credit
rating agencies? There are both similarities and differences between the two industries.
Consumer Reports’ mission statement says “Consumers Union (CU) is an expert,
independent, nonprofit organization whose mission is to work for a fair, just, and safe
marketplace for all consumers and to empower consumers to protect themselves. The
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organization was founded in 1936 when advertising first flooded the mass media.
Consumers lacked a reliable source of information they could depend on to help them
distinguish hype from fact and good products from bad ones. Since then CU has filled
that vacuum with a broad range of consumer information. To maintain its independence
and impartiality, CU accepts no outside advertising and no free samples and employs
several hundred mystery shoppers and technical experts to buy and test the products it
evaluates 16 .” Consumer Reports’ mission statement does not mention anything about
opinions or whether or not their ratings should be acted upon. The main objective of their
mission statement is to emphasize that they have taken steps to address conflicts of
interest. J.D. Power and Associates’ mission statement says “J.D. Power and Associates
is a global marketing information services company operating in key business sectors
across a variety of industries, including market research, automotive forecasting,
performance improvement, Web intelligence, and customer satisfaction. Established in
1968, the company has been listening to consumers and business customers; analyzing
their opinions and perceptions; and refining research techniques and study methodologies
to offer some of the most advanced product quality, customer satisfaction, and tracking
research available today. The company’s quality and satisfaction measurements are based
on responses from millions of consumers annually.” Their mission statement does not
mention that their ratings are opinions nor does it mention that their ratings should not be
acted upon. While most credit rating agencies mention that their ratings are published
opinions and should not be acted on, the product rating market does not take these
measures.

16

For more information on Consumer Reports see consumerreports.org.
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It is evident that the product rating market has managed to get the rating process
right. There are many aspects of the product rating market that the credit rating industry
could incorporate to produce the best quality ratings possible.

D. Summary
The credit rating industry is very important and has a significant impact on the
financial system. They have such a large impact because they are market makers. Since
this industry has so much power in the financial markets, it’s essential that their ratings
are as accurate as possible. The flaws in the credit rating industry have been exposed with
the most recent financial crisis. The credit rating industry could potentially learn from the
product rating market. Companies, like Consumer Reports, have managed to produce
nonbiased ratings by taking extensive measures to address conflicts of interest, and the
same could be done in the credit rating market.
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Chapter 3: A New Framework for the Industry
What type of reform would potentially increase the reliability of credit rating
agencies? It is evident from the previous section that there are some significant
imperfections in the credit rating market. A large numbers of credit ratings did not
accurately reflect the ex-post risks embedded and the 2007 financial crisis highlighted
this. The ratings on various financial products could have been affected by conflicts of
interest and lack of accountability. There are three types of reform that might provide
better results than the current ratings system. The credit rating market could be marketbased, subscription based, or government based. There are benefits and drawbacks from
each option however, they might be more effective at providing the most accurate credit
ratings.

A. Market-Based System
One possible solution that would reform the credit rating industry would be to
move credit rating agencies to a market-based system, meaning that there are no ratings
because the market determines the creditworthiness of the product and this is reflected in
the price of the product. A market-based system would be based on credit default swap
rates. A credit default swap is a contract in which the buyer of the credit default swap
makes a series of payments to the seller and receives payoff, in exchange, if the credit
instrument experiences a credit event, such as default. Credit default swaps are used to
hedge risk and are a form of reverse trading. For example a product with a low
probability of defaulting would be traded at lower levels than products with higher
probabilities of defaulting. The market would, essentially, determine if the specific
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products are investment grade or speculative based on the prices of the credit default
swaps.
There are many benefits to a market-based system. The first benefit would be the
elimination of conflicts of interest. Currently, there is a tremendous amount of conflict of
interest in the credit rating industry and a market-based system would take a significant
step to ensure that no firms are influencing the ratings of specific financial products. A
second benefit of moving to a system based on credit default swaps is that investment
decisions would no longer be based on “upgrades” or “downgrades” put out by credit
rating agencies. Institutions would be forced to conduct their own research on the
financial products they are investing in and they are held accountable for the outcomes of
their investment decisions. A third important benefit is that credit rating agencies would
no longer be in federal regulations. This means that there will not be an artificial demand
for certain products just because they are required by regulation.
It should be noted that a market-based system has some drawbacks. The first
drawback from a market-based system is that certain financial products will not be
“rated”. In a market-based system there are not credit default swaps on every product,
therefore certain products will be omitted from the system, similar to the product rating
market. In the issuer-pay model, like the current credit rating system, any product can
receive a rating as long as the issuer pays one of the credit rating agencies. This means
that specific products are not omitted from the system. A second drawback from a
market-based system is that specific credit default swaps might not be very liquid. This
would mean that there is low volume, which would significantly affect the spread (the
difference between the bid and the ask) of the products being traded. A credit default

34

swap that isn’t very liquid would not reflect the true creditworthiness of the underlying
financial product. Each system has its advantages and disadvantages, thus making it
challenging to determine which is the most efficient.
Although the market-based system has its drawbacks, it is likely to provide an
unbiased evaluation of financial products. It will otherwise be difficult to get an unbiased
evaluation if credit rating agencies are involved. This is just one plausible option that
would address some of the identified imperfections in the credit rating industry.

B. Subscription-Based System
Another possible solution to reform the credit rating industry would be for the
agencies to move away from the issuer-pay model to the subscription-based model in
order to generate revenue. The subscription-based model is when investors or institutions
pay the credit rating agencies in order to get their ratings on specific financial products.
This is how Consumer Reports operates and how the credit rating agencies operated over
40 years ago.
The subscription model in the credit rating industry has its benefits. One of the
biggest advantages of this model is that the majority of the existing conflicts of interest
will be eliminated. Conflicts of interest would be eliminated because companies would
no longer be paying the agencies to rate their products. The subscription model would
remove the issuers of the financial products entirely, whereas they currently deal directly
with the credit rating agencies. A second indirect benefit of this model is that it will
promote accountability because the subscribers will no longer purchase the credit rating
agencies’ products if their ratings are constantly inaccurate or inflated. The current
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issuer-pay model does not hold credit rating agencies accountable for their ratings
because there is no way for the companies to lose revenue. The current system
encourages companies to inflate ratings in order to gain issuers. If the agencies provide
inaccurate ratings there is no way for the investors to hold them accountable, however if
there was a subscription based model investors could. The subscription model had proven
to be effective in the product rating market and it could do the same in the credit rating
industry.
However, there are some drawbacks to the subscription model. Similar to the
market-based system, certain products might be omitted from the rating process. A
second disadvantage that could arise from the subscription-based model would be the
free-rider issue. This is the initial reason why the credit rating agencies moved to the
issuer-pay model. Individuals that do not subscribe to the agencies might get the
information from a subscriber, causing losses in revenue for the credit rating agencies.
The free-rider problem is a significant issue with this business model and a cause for
concern among credit rating agencies. The third disadvantage of this business model is
that there could be a potential conflict of interests. A conflict of interest could occur
because of the institutions that would subscribe to receive the rating information. Large
institutions and hedge funds would be the majority of subscribers and the main form of
revenue. Institutions and hedge funds invest in various financial products and the ratings
of these products could have a direct impact on the value of these financial products. The
credit rating agencies might be incentized to provide inaccurate ratings to keep their
subscribers happy. If large accounts threaten to cancel their subscription if ratings are not
to their liking, the agencies could potentially have a conflict of interest. However, a
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conflict of interest might always exist but taking steps to address it is how the credit
rating industry will be improved.
A fourth drawback of the subscription-based model is that not all of the
information is accessible to the public. Individual investors would find it difficult to
obtain credit rating information because the majority of small investors could not afford
the subscription. However, a plausible solution to price discrimination could be a
government subsidy. The government could provide an allowance to small investors that
cannot afford the costly subscription. In the corporate environment the government could
enable corporations to pay for their subscriptions with pre-tax dollars, which is another
way of subsidizing the subscription for institutions that cannot afford it. A government
subsidy would benefit all parties because all investors could obtains a subscription, the
agencies are generating revenue from new subscribers, and conflicts of interest are
minimized.
The subscription model would be a good alternative to the issuer-pay model. A
subscription-based system would provide increased accountability while eliminating
some conflicts of interest. There are drawbacks associated with the subscription-based
model, like the free-rider problem and omission of certain financial products. Overall,
this system is a plausible alternative to the issuer-pay model.

C. Government-Based System
Implementing a government-based or government funded credit rating agency is
another possible reform that could make the credit rating industry more efficient. A
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government-based system would be similar to the Food and Drug Administration 17 .
Funds in the federal budget would be allocated to ensure the government-based credit
rating system would be able to operate effectively. The government-based system would
allow every investor and institution to access its ratings on various financial products.
The ratings would be public goods and the government would incur all costs. In order to
have products rated, the issuers would approach the government-based credit rating
agency and provide all necessary information, as they would to the current private credit
rating agencies. The issuers of the debt will have to incur all costs associated with the
ratings process. The government-based system would then provide ratings on the various
financial products. A government-based system has been sufficient in the food and drug
market, suggesting that it might be effective in the credit rating industry.
There are many benefits to a government-based credit rating agency. The first is
that credit ratings will be available to everyone because it is a public good. Making credit
ratings a public good would eliminate some of the disadvantages of the subscriptionbased system and the issuer-pay system. A second benefit is that financial products would
not be omitted from the evaluation process. In a government-based system, all issuers
would be able to have their products rated, something that would be difficult in a
subscription-based and market-based system. A third benefit from a government-based
system would be a central rating agency, as opposed to numerous agencies with different
types of ratings and rating methodologies. Both institutions and issuers would benefit
from a uniform way of rating products. A government-based system might encourage
more accurate ratings because it would have a vested interest in the health of the U.S.
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economy, making it less likely to inflate ratings because of the impact downgrades can
have.
While there are many benefits to a credit rating system backed by the U.S.
government, there are also disadvantages. If a government-based system were to rate
financial products there could be a potential conflict of interest. If a government-based
system were to rate U.S. debt then it might be inclined to provide a AAA rating. The
government-based agency, most likely, would not downgrade U.S. debt because of the
negative repercussions it would have in terms of financing and stability. This
demonstrates how a conflict of interest could arise; however the government-based
system would be very reliable with corporate debt and financial products. A second
disadvantage of this system is that the U.S. government backs the credit ratings; therefore
if financial products are misrated then the government is held accountable. This could
pose a problem because if the government-based credit rating agency provides high
ratings on products which later default, the government might be sued by the investors
who relied on the credit ratings.
A serious problem that could be encountered by a government-based system is
that citizens might not be willing to have their tax dollars go towards an institution that
does not directly benefit them. If taxpayers are not willing to fund a new government
agency then this would not be a possibility. A second serious problem that could arise is
moral hazard. The government-rating agency could potentially rate certain bell-weather
institutions generously because of the ramifications they could have on the overall
financial markets, which directly affects the U.S. economy.
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The government-based system could be an efficient way to produce accurate
credit ratings with minimal conflicts of interest. This solution has its advantages and
disadvantages but it’s a strong alternative to the current credit rating system.
Each one of these systems is a plausible solution to the current imperfections in
the credit rating industry (see the table below for the benefits and drawbacks for each). A
single solution cannot address all the issues in the market, however it is essential to
minimize the imperfections. It is evident that the credit rating industry needs to be
reformed and each one of these solutions is a step in the right direction.
Benefits and Drawbacks to Each Plausible Reform
Policy
Recommendation
Advantages
Disadvantages

Market Based Model

Minimizes conflicts of
interest

Some financial products
will not be rated,
omission of products

Investment decisions no
longer based on ratings
Removal of credit rating
agencies from federal
regulation

Specific products might
might lack liquidity,
making it difficult to
assess credit worthiness

Minimizes conflicts of
interest

Some financial products
will not be rated,
omission of products

Subscription Based Model
Promote accountability
because of feedback
mechanism
Credit ratings are public
information
Government Based Model

All products could be
rated, none are omitted
Central rating agency,
set methodology for
rating products

Free-rider problem
Not all information is
accessible to public
Potential conflicts of
interests could arise
Potential conflicts of
interests could arise
Government could be
held accountable for
inaccurate ratings
Would need tax payers'
approval
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Chapter 4: Alternative Industry Solutions
The three policy changes mentioned above are strong options to reform the credit
rating industry; however, there are a couple other alternatives that could have a
significant impact as well. Two additional ways that the credit industry could be reform is
through a two-tier system and a rating agency established to perform evaluations of the
credit rating agencies.

A. Two-Tier System
A two-tier system would have both subscription-based agencies and issuer-pay
based agencies. Combining both systems would enable the consumers to reap the benefits
of each system. A two-tier system would be established by having a select group of rating
agencies operating on the issuer-pay model and another group operating on the
subscription model. The main group would be the ratings agencies that were operating on
the subscription model. This would be most effective because the issuers of debt are no
longer influencing the ratings on the products being rated. All the major corporations and
their financial products would be rated by the agencies under the subscription model. The
second tier would be the issuer-pay agencies. This group would be paid by companies to
rate their products but the products are the ones that were omitted from the first tier. This
system would enable all products to be rated in a way that minimizes conflicts of interest.
Both tiers of this system would have to collaborate with each other to ensure that the
same products are not getting rated twice. Investors would benefit because they would
still be able to get their ratings from the three main credit rating agencies with the best
reputation, while still being able to find ratings on lesser know products through the
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second tier. The two-tier system would incorporate the benefits of each system and
would, most likely, lead to more accurate ratings.

B. Rating Agency For Credit Rating Agencies
A new financial innovation that might develop as a result of the 2007 financial
crisis would be a rating agency providing ratings on credit rating agencies. A rating
agency of this sort is needed in the market because investors and institutions might find it
difficult to determine which credit rating agency provides the highest quality ratings. This
new rating company would operate under the subscription model so that there are no
conflicts of interests. The company would gather information on the products each credit
rating agency rates, the ratings they received, the performance of the products, and the
conclusion if the products received the proper rating. The rating firm would then compile
this information and provide a detailed analysis of which credit agencies were the most
reliable and provided the best information. There is a significant benefit to this proposal;
there would be a feedback mechanism for credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies
have lacked a significant feedback mechanism and, thus, one of the reasons why they
aren’t held accountable for their ratings. This new rating agency would be a feedback
mechanism because if the credit rating agencies didn’t provide accurate or unbiased
ratings, the rating company will determine that and investors will be made aware.
Investors and Institutions would no longer rely on the credit rating agencies; hurting their
reputational capital. As previously mentioned, reputational capital is essential for credit
rating agencies and a way to hold them accountable would be to hurt their reputation in
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the market. This new rating agency would provide a means to do that and fill the need for
a feedback mechanism.

C. New Regulation in the Credit Rating Industry
After the 2007 financial crisis, some steps have been taken to make the credit
rating industry more reliable. The two main bills that were past that affected credit rating
agencies were the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, as previously mentioned, and the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Dodd-Frank
legislation has attempted to protect against similar crises reoccurring in the future. DoddFrank has also had an impact on the credit rating industry.
The first provision from this piece of legislation was the removal of credit rating
agencies references from all government regulation. This means that investors and issuers
are no longer required to use any particular benchmarks of risk, such as credit ratings.
This impacts the credit rating industry because credit ratings from these companies are no
longer essential, making their ratings less significant in the market place. The credit
rating industry strongly opposes this provision because their ratings are no longer
mandatory. This rule change, once adopted, effectively frees banks from having to pay
one of the designated agencies to rate their products. Credit rating agencies have done a
significant amount of lobbying as a result of Dodd-Frank. The big three agencies have
spent over $6 million in lobbying since this legislation was passed in 2009. This capital
was to delay various provisions of the financial reform. However, credit ratings will
continue to have a strong impact on the market and the credit rating industry will
continue to be market makers.
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Two other provisions from the Dodd-Frank legislation require the SEC to conduct
a study to determine which ways the independence of NRSROs can be strengthened, as
well as, a study of alternative business models for NRSROs compensation. These are
steps to address conflicts of interest because their business models are the biggest
concern. These three provisions are the most significant ones affecting credit rating
agencies. The financial crisis of 2007 highlighted weaknesses in the credit rating industry
and the government has taken steps to address these weaknesses. However, there are
other policy changes that might make the industry more efficient and reliable.

D. Alternative Perspectives to Increased Regulation
While many scholars and government officials believe more regulation will be
better for the credit rating industry and the financial markets, White (2010) argues the
contrary. White’s has a different perspective on what needs to be done in the credit rating
industry. White believes that increased regulation will only raise the costs of providing
ratings and, thus, would raise the barriers of entry into the market. This, White argues,
will tend to discourage new ideas, new methodologies, new technology, new business
models, and even discourage innovation. The increased regulation will only make the
credit rating agencies more important in the financial markets, which is the opposite of
what the regulation is focused on. White suggests “ There is a better way. That way
involves less regulation of the credit rating agencies, as well as a reformulation of the
prudential regulation of financial institutions’ bond portfolios. The result would be more
entry and more innovation in the provision of information for the bond markets and
greater efficiency in those markets.” Less regulation is a strong alternative because it
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would encourage competition. There are many other sources about the creditworthiness
of bonds and its issuers, in addition to the major credit rating agencies. White also says
that the reliance on credit rating agencies has been a function “of over seven decades of
prudential regulation of institutional bond portfolios, which began with banks and then
spread to insurance companies, pension funds, securities firms, and money market mutual
funds, whereby these institutions were required to heed the ratings of a select handful of
rating firms.” White makes a strong argument for deregulation because of the
disadvantages that the new regulation could have.
Bonewitz (2010) also believes that there needs to be reform in the credit rating
industry, but not in the form of increased regulation. Bonewitz argues that regulators
need to remove the NRSRO distinction from the credit rating industry and establish a
system based on market measures. Bonewitz says “NRSROs currently lack incentives to
preserve their reputation for accuracy when it conflicts with selling regulatory licenses
and garnering short-term profits. Replacing the NRSRO mechanism with a system that
shifts ultimate responsibility from certified third parties to regulated investors, but allows
such investors to largely rely on market measures of credit risk, will improve the
performance of credit rating agencies, enhance the protection of investors, and encounter
less credible resistance. Without further reform, inaccuracy will remain endemic to the
NRSRO regime and another round of painful, dilatory downgrades should be expected
with the next market downturn.” This is another alternative perspective on the reform that
needs to occur in credit rating industry to address the existing imperfections.
A second paper that has similar views on reform in the credit rating industry is
Utzig (2010). Utzig believes that placing the NRSRO label on an agency “places CRAs
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in a position of unqualified authority as the central source of information about the
creditworthiness of bonds and structured finance products.” Utzig also examines
competition in the credit rating industry and appropriate reforms to address this
imperfection. Utzig argues that “the current tight oligopoly is unlikely to be broken up
under the existing “issuer pays” system because neither issuers nor CRAs have an interest
in more ratings. Nevertheless, switching to an “investor pays” model should not in itself
be expected to produce a quick fix. Whereas in the “issuer pays” model competition can
lead to inflated ratings because the company chooses who should rate them, in the
“investor pays” model there is a free rider problem, and it is not clear how the free market
can resolve it. This dilemma could, however, be solved by decoupling the competition
problem from the ratings market. The service required is an assessment of credit quality
or the risk of default. A credit rating is only one of the instruments capable of performing
this task. Credit default swaps, for example, fulfill a comparable function from an
alternative starting point. If the relevant market is defined in this way, financial market
regulation itself will automatically have a direct role to play in enhancing competition
because by using ratings to regulate banks it contributes directly to the reduction in
competition.” This excerpt provides a plausible alternative to the current issuer-pay and
investor-pay models.
Stiglitz (2010) argues that increasing competition in the credit rating industry will
not correct any existing imperfections. Stiglitz believes that increased competition would
not correct the industry because conflicts of interest would still exist which is the most
significant imperfection. Removing the barriers to entry is a very small reform, which
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would not address the underlying problems. Stiglitz argues that much larger reforms need
to take place in the credit rating industry.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The goal of this study was to determine what type of reform would best suit the
credit rating industry. An analysis of the credit rating industry suggests that there are
numerous imperfections, which need to be addressed. The main imperfections existing in
the credit rating industry are a lack of accountability, lack of competition, conflicts of
interest, and asymmetric information. Regulations, the SEC, and the financial
markets/investors have not held credit rating agencies accountable for their ratings, which
is evident by the lawsuit examples provided above. The lack of competition has resulted
from barriers to entry established by the SEC and the conflicts of interest are a product of
the issuer-pay model. Since the credit rating industry has such a large impact on the
financial market, it is essential that these issues are addressed.
These imperfections suggest that there must be a reform of the way credit rating
agencies generate revenue and steps must be taken to hold them accountable for their
ratings. The first major reform was moving towards a market-based system. This system
would completely do away with credit rating agencies, eliminating many conflicts of
interest and giving the market perceptions on the creditworthiness of financial products.
Another suggested reform was moving from the issuer-pay model to a subscription-based
model, similar to how Consumer Reports operates. This would eliminate some significant
conflicts of interest and would be beneficial to the financial industry. The third plausible
change would be to have a government-based system. This also has many advantages
over the current issuer-pay model. Each one of these possible reforms has advantages and
disadvantages, but the main objective is to produce unbiased and accurate ratings.
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The solutions that I believe would be the most effective would be the marketbased solution or the subscription-based model. Conflicts of interest, in my opinion, have
hindered credit rating agencies’ ability to accurately rate financial products. Both the
market-based and subscription-based solutions attempt to minimize conflicts of interest,
which leads me to believe that they would have the best outcome. It is critical that proper
actions are taken to address the many imperfections of the credit rating industry.
Regulators have taken steps to address some of the issues in the credit rating
industry, however much more needs to be done. This thesis highlights some shortcomings
and provides possible solutions. There are some limitations of this paper however. Future
research might want to examine which AAA rated products have defaulted since they
were rated by the rating agencies and why those products received those ratings. The
credit rating industry is essential to the financial markets, thus the reason why reform
must correct the current market imperfections.
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